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Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) are characterized by fear or anxiety about
social situations, but also by important alterations in self-referential processing. Given
advances in our understanding of the neurocircuitry and neurochemistry of SAD, the
question arises of the relationship between this research and an emergent literature on
the psychobiology of self and self-consciousness. A number of investigations of SAD
have highlighted altered activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; involved in self-
representation), insula (involved in interoceptive processing), and other structures that
play a role in bodily self-consciousness, as well as the potential value of interventions
such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) and self-focused reappraisal
in normalizing such changes. Future studies to more closely investigate associations
between psychobiological alterations and changes in self-related processing in SAD,
may be useful in shedding additional light on both SAD and self-consciousness.
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Social anxiety disorder (SAD or social phobia) is characterized in DSM-5 in terms of fear or
anxiety about social situations in which the individual is exposed to possible scrutiny by others
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Patients with SAD may have important alterations
in self-referential processing (Gaebler et al., 2014; Jazaieri et al., 2015), and self-consciousness
in SAD may be associated with increased severity of social anxiety (Hope and Heimberg,
1988). Given advances in our understanding of the neurocircuitry and neurochemistry of SAD
(Hattingh et al., 2012; Fox and Kalin, 2014), the question arises of the relationship between
this research and an emergent literature on the psychobiology of self and self-consciousness
(Northoff et al., 2011)? Here I briefly address this issue.
Sad and Self-Consciousness
To begin with, it is important to establish the nature of self-consciousness in SAD. A distinction
has been drawn between public self-consciousness, or awareness of the public aspects of the self,
and private self-consciousness, or awareness of one’s thoughts and feelings (Hope and Heimberg,
1988). SAD patients with high public self-consciousness were found to have more social anxiety,
while those with high private self-consciousness where found to report more extensively and more
accurately on their internal states (Hope and Heimberg, 1988). Still, the literature in this area is
surprisingly sparse, and a good deal remains to be learned about the predictors and associations of
self-consciousness and related phenomena in SAD (Schlenker and Leary, 1982; Panayiotou et al.,
2014).
A construct that may be partially related to self-consciousness is that of self-focused
attention. This has been defined in terms of awareness of self-referent, internally generated
information, and may include awareness of thoughts and feelings, as well as of body
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 489
Stein SAD and self-consciousness
state information (Ingram, 1990). Ingram suggested that
excessive self-focused attention or self-absorption is involved in
pathogenesis of a number of mental disorders, but with aspects of
altered attention differentiating various conditions. Subsequent
reviews have emphasized that self-focused attention is associated
with increases in social anxiety, poor social performance,
and negative self-judgments and attributions, with reduction
following successful treatment of SAD (Spurr and Stopa, 2002),
and have argued that attentional strategies should be targeted
during SAD treatment (Bögels and Mansell, 2004).
Certainly, an influential model of cognitive-behavioral
therapy (CBT) for SAD is based on the notion that self-
focused attention is an important maintaining factor in SAD,
increasing access to negative thoughts and self-imagery during
social situations (Clark and Wells, 1995). That said, there appear
to be a range of information-processing biases in SAD (Hirsch
and Clark, 2004), and another influential CBTmodel emphasizes
that in SAD there is attention to both internal cues and external
stimuli indicative of negative evaluation (Schultz and Heimberg,
2008). Trials of attention bias modification (ABM) in SAD are
not persuasive, although this perhaps reflects methodological
issues (such as remote delivery of ABM; Heeren et al., 2015).
Perhaps self-related processing is more relevant to SAD than
more general attentional processes. Indeed, a range of alterations
in self-processing in SAD deserve better characterization and
further exploration (Stein, 2009; Gaebler et al., 2014).
Neurocircuitry of Sad
Multiple brain imaging studies of SAD have contributed to
our understanding of the neurocircuitry of SAD (Stein and
Stein, 2008). A recent meta-analysis of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies found that most significant
areas of activation during emotional vs. neutral stimuli
in individuals with SAD compared to controls included
bilateral amygdala, anterior cingulate, and globus pallidus
(Hattingh et al., 2012). These findings are consistent with
an animal literature emphasizing the involvement of the
amygdala in fear conditioning (Davis, 1990). There are,
however, also some imaging findings in individual studies
of SAD, such as increased activation in temporoparietal
regions, including posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and
supramarginal gyrus (SMG)/temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),
which are consistent with increased bodily self-consciousness
(Gaebler et al., 2014).
In addition, there is evidence that during fMRI, individuals
with SAD demonstrate increased blood-oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) responses relative to controls, in medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and amygdala after self-referential
criticism, but not after self-referential praise, or after other-
referential criticism or praise (Blair et al., 2008). In a study
of individuals with subclinical social anxiety, self-referential
processing was associated with activity in the mPFC (thought
to be involved in self-representation), posterior cingulate and
temporal poles (Abraham et al., 2013). Furthermore, compared
to low socially anxious individuals, highly socially anxious
individuals demonstrated increased activation ofmPFC, TPJ, and
temporal pole when they focused their attention inwardly rather
than outwardly during a simulated social situation (Boehme
et al., 2015). Finally, increased amygdala activity in SAD is
reduced after group CBT (Furmark et al., 2002) and after
internet-CBT (Mansson et al., 2013).
The insula appears to play an important role in interoceptive
processing and self-consciousness (Ronchi et al., 2015). It is
notable therefore that a number of functional imaging studies
have found altered activity in the insula in SAD, and that after
pharmacotherapy with either a serotonin selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) or a reversible inhibitor of monoamine
oxidase inhibitor (RIMA), SAD patients had decreased insula
activation at rest (Warwick et al., 2006). Other SAD studies
have found that activation of various structures including
insula and temporo-parietal regions was normalized by CBT
(Klumpp et al., 2013) as well as by emotional regulation
techniques such as self-focused reappraisal (Brühl et al., 2013;
Gaebler et al., 2014). Given the growing literature on the
neurocircuitry of self-related processes and self-focused attention
(Stein, 2007; Northoff et al., 2011), additional work is needed
to link alterations in structural and functional brain imaging
in SAD with assessments of self-consciousness and related
processes.
Neurochemistry of Sad
Multiple neurotransmitter and neuroendocrine systems have
been investigated in SAD (Fox and Kalin, 2014). There is
evidence that SAD is characterized by alterations in both the
dopaminergic and serotonergic systems in particular (Stein et al.,
2002; Frick et al., 2015). Neuropeptides such as oxytocin may
well be important in mediating social anxiety. Still alterations in
such systems have not yet been shown to be specific for SAD, and
while SAD has moderate heritability, the particular neurogenetic
variations underlying this condition also remain uncertain (Fox
and Kalin, 2014).
Broadly speaking, neurochemical systems clearly play an
important role in brain regions that mediate both SAD
as well as self-related processes. Furthermore, it is possible
that neurotransmitter systems involved in SAD, such as the
dopaminergic and serotonergic systems, also have a role in
self-related processes such as corporeal awareness (Albrecht
et al., 2011). That said, few studies have specifically integrated
measures of neurochemical systems in SAD together with
assessment of alterations in self-consciousness, self-focused
attention, or related phenomena in SAD.
Blushing and gaze aversion may be particularly important
symptom of SAD, and they may also be closely related to
self-consciousness (Stein and Bouwer, 1997a). There is some
preliminary work on the neurochemistry of blushing, although
a good deal more investigation is needed to fully understanding
the psychobiology of blushing, and possible psychobiological
abnormalities in patients with persistent blushing in the context
of SAD (Stein and Bouwer, 1997a). For now, given the absence
of studies that directly address this issue, it again seems
speculative to draw associations between neurotransmitter and
neuroendocrine alterations in SAD, and specific SAD symptoms
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(such as blushing and gaze version) that are associated with
increased self-consciousness or self-focused attention.
Evolutionary Psychiatry and Sad
Any question in biology may be addressed by considering
both the relevant proximal or physiological explanations (e.g.,
the psychobiology of SAD) as well as the related distal or
evolutionary explanations (e.g., the adaptive value of social
anxiety; Mayr, 1982). A growing literature has explored the
adaptive value of anxiety, and the implications of an evolutionary
perspective for understanding anxiety and related disorders such
as SAD (Stein and Bouwer, 1997b; Stein and Nesse, 2015).
From this perspective, social anxiety is adaptive insofar as
it appropriately alerts humans to social threat, and ensures
successful negotiation of social hierarchies. It is relevant to
consider here whether the evolutionary literature on social
anxiety bears any relationship to that on self-consciousness.
It is notable that blushing was comprehensively discussed
by Darwin (1872). From an evolutionary perspective,
blushing can be considered an ‘‘appeasement display’’
which has adaptive value in decreasing aggression between
conspecifics (Stein and Vythilingum, 2007). SAD may be
characterized by a low threshold for such displays. It is
significant, perhaps, that both blushing and social anxiety
increase during adolescence, a time when self-related
processing becomes more sophisticated and when public self-
consciousness often increases. Such changes may speculatively
be mediated by alterations in mPFC and striatum-mPFC
connectivity during adolescence (Somerville et al., 2013).
While human neurodevelopment can be understood from an
adaptive life-course perspective, this period in life certainly
represents a challenge for emotional self-regulation (Stein,
2008).
Conclusion
Social anxiety and SAD appear to be phenomena that are
highly relevant to a consideration of the psychobiology of
self-consciousness. Given how important social anxiety is
in everyday life, and how prevalent and disabling SAD is
(Stein et al., 2010), much additional work is needed to fully
delineate their psychobiology. Nevertheless, the literature on
SAD has begun to address the psychobiology of alterations
in self-related processing and self-focused attention, and it is
remarkable that a number of investigations of this disorder have
highlighted altered activity in mPFC (involved in representation
of the self), insula (involved in interoceptive processing)
and in other structures that play a role in bodily self-
consciousness, as well as the potential value of interventions
such as SSRIs and self-focused reappraisal in normalizing
such changes. It may be valuable for future investigations
to more closely address associations between psychobiological
alterations and changes in self-related processing in SAD,
in order to shed additional light on both SAD and self-
consciousness.
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